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This article examines the relationship between affirmative 
action and regime change in Fiji—in particular, how affirmative 
action has been used as a tool of social engineering. It argues 
that affirmative action is more than an ordinary policy 
prescription; rather, it has fundamental social engineering 
and restructuring intent, based on political and ideological 
considerations. Changes in the affirmative action programs 
have been associated with changes in the interests of the 
ruling élites, and, since independence, there have been shifts 
in emphasis and strategies resulting from the interests of the 
élites. Many affirmative action programs have led to failure and 
loss of state resources. Since the military coup in 2006, most of 
the affirmative action programs associated with past regimes 
have been removed, including through the dramatic control and 
then weakening of the indigenous Fijian middle class, which 
benefited from past affirmative action policies. Paradoxically, 
under the rubric of ‘rural development’, the interim government 
has reinvented affirmative action, but it is now targeted at poor 
rural villagers and shuns the middle class.
Steven Ratuva is a political 
sociologist at the University of 
Auckland.
Vakatorocaketaki ni taukei:  
the politics of affirmative action in 
post colonial fiji
Steven Ratuva
Affirmative action is an often-controversial 
mechanism used by states to address issues 
of equity, conflict resolution, historical repa-
ration and empowerment for disadvantaged 
groups. It is commonly conceptualised 
as government-mandated ‘preferential 
policies’ towards government-mandated 
groups (Sowell 1990:10). Sowell’s emphasis 
on ‘preferential policies’ can be misleading 
because, as shown in countries such as 
Malaysia and Fiji, affirmative action can be 
a framework for major restructuring and 
social engineering. This article argues that 
rather than being just a policy response to 
historically defined conditions, it is often 
driven by political, economic and ideo-
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logical imperatives for the purpose of social 
reconstruction and engineering. Affirmative 
action in Fiji has been driven by evolving 
political imperatives—initially, by the push 
for multi-racialism after independence in 
1970; by ethno-nationalism after the 1987 
and 2000 coups; and by counter-ethno-
nationalism after the 2006 coup—all for the 
purpose of socially engineering a new order 
(Ratuva 2009). 
The theoretical discourse on affirmative 
action spans a number of areas includ-
ing political representation, educational 
opportunities, employment, and economic 
advancement for disadvantaged social 
groups, identified on the basis of gender, 
class, caste, ethnicity or physical disability 
(Kellough 2006; Lipson 2006; Sterba 2009; 
Wines 2006). There has also been recogni-
tion of the importance of psychological 
approaches concerning the cognitive and 
behavioural dispositions of designated 
and non-designated communities and the 
impact of these on society as a whole (Bobo 
1998; Crosby and Franco 2003). The question 
of who should be part of the designated 
category and the justification for defining 
the designated category are often political 
(Neblo 2009) based on negotiating the bigger 
issues: ethnic relations, conflict, culture, 
power and equality. Attempts at implemen-
tation through use of labour-market quotas 
have been contested by some on the basis 
of equity and justice—the same arguments 
used to justify affirmative action in the first 
place (Jain, Sloane and Horwitz 2003). 
Some justificatory principles for affirma-
tive action are quite common in some 
countries. The notion of ‘correcting historical 
wrongs’ is used in the United States (Pincus 
2003), South Africa (Horwitz 2009), Canada 
(Agocs 2009) and Namibia (Usiku 2009); 
while ‘equity creation’ is used in Malaysia 
(Gometz 2009), Brazil (Bernardino-Costa 
2010), Northern Ireland (Harvey 2010), Fiji 
(Ratuva 2010) and India (Parikh 2010). One 
of the underlying assumptions is that the 
creation of equity and a just society is a 
precondition for political stability (Kende 
2009). In some of these counties (the United 
States, India, Canada and Brazil), the 
designated categories are minorities, while 
in others (Fiji, Malaysia, South Africa and 
Namibia), the designated categories are not 
only ethnic but also politically dominant 
majorities. Cottrell and Ghai (2007) make 
the argument with respect to Fiji that indig-
enous Fijians were not exploited minorities 
and did not deserve affirmative action; 
however, the complex interplay between 
politics and ethnicity created a situation 
where ‘affirmative action becomes deeply 
implicated in inter-community politics as 
well as in the structure of the state’ (Cottrell 
and Ghai 2007:228).
The criticism of affirmative action as 
‘reverse discrimination’ is based on the 
assertion that it is contradictory and mor-
ally repugnant to use categories such as 
sex, religion or race—which were the basis 
for earlier discrimination—as the basis for 
affirmative action (Faundez 1994:4). While 
ethnic affirmative action is highly contro-
versial, gender affirmative action is the least 
controversial because of the cross-communal 
and increasingly internationalised and 
universally accepted principle of gender 
equality. There is a strong argument that 
if gender-based affirmative action—or 
any other form of affirmative action for 
that matter—is compensatory or based on 
reparation then it is morally justified (Pincus 
2003). 
The debate about affirmative action in 
Fiji has largely revolved around a number of 
issues, including the need for equity, nation 
building, conflict resolution, rights of indi-
genes, and the definition and composition 
of the ‘disadvantaged’. The first argument, 
based on the International Labour Organisa-
tion (ILO) Convention of Indigenous Rights 
(169), was that indigenous Fijians—because 
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of their relative lack of entrepreneurial 
participation, educational and profes-
sional achievement, and socioeconomic 
development, and by virtue of their being 
indigenes—should be the main designated 
category (Fijian Initiative Group 1992; Gov-
ernment of Fiji 1990; Qarase 1995). Herein 
was a veiled warning that failure to address 
the Fijian question would continue to create 
conditions for ethno-political volatility and 
conflict (Fisk 1970; Government of Fiji 2001). 
So, affirmative action was seen as serving 
multidimensional interests—as a means of 
redressing inequality, as an unquestioned 
natural right of indigenous Fijians, and as 
a conflict-resolution mechanism.
The second and contrary position was 
that the disadvantaged category should 
be de-ethnicised and inclusive to include 
anyone from any ethnic group considered 
to be socioeconomically disadvantaged—a 
principle that was seen to reflect the spirit 
of multiculturalism, inclusivity and ‘social 
justice’ enshrined in the 1997 Constitution 
(Government of Fiji 1997:s. 44, pp. 32–3).
The third argument was that affirmative 
action should be targeted at addressing pov-
erty because poverty was trans-ethnic and 
was worsening as a result of a number of 
factors, including the contracting economy 
and lack of opportunities (Chand 2007; 
ECREA 2005). 
The fourth argument—advocated by 
the current ruling military regime—is that 
affirmative action is fraudulent and a tool 
of rent seeking and corruption by both 
indigenous Fijian and non-indigenous Fijian 
élites, rather than a means of advancement 
for disadvantaged groups (Ratuva 2009). 
The military regime has abolished virtually 
all the affirmative action programs associ-
ated with previous governments and has 
set up the Fiji Islands Commission Against 
Corruption (FICAC) to investigate cases of 
corruption associated with them. The focus 
has turned to poverty reduction and rural 
development carried out within the ambit 
of the People’s Charter (Government of Fiji 
2008)—a social engineering framework for 
socioeconomic and socio-political transfor-
mation in Fiji.
One of the first tasks of the military 
regime when it captured state power in 
the December 2006 coup was to engage in 
comprehensive political engineering—a 
component of which was the eradication 
of any institution, program or policy from 
the old order that it considered archaic, cor-
rupt or racist. Affirmative action was one 
of their main targets, primarily because it 
was seen to be pro-indigenous Fijian and 
was thus considered ‘racist’, and, worse 
still, affirmative action was shrouded in 
controversy as a result of a major corruption 
scandal (the so-called ‘agricultural scam’) 
under the deposed government of Laisenia 
Qarase (‘Agriculture scam trial continues’, 
Fiji Times, 7 July 2008). Affirmative action 
has never been mentioned in any of the 
military regime’s policy statements, except 
in derogatory terms when reference has 
been made to the Qarase government (‘Fiji 
goes on the offensive’, Island Business, 4 
December 2008). The paradox is that the 
military regime has reinvented affirmative 
action to shift it away from consolidating an 
indigenous middle class to service delivery 
to indigenous rural villagers as a strategy 
to boost indigenous Fijian development 
(vakatorocaketaki ni taukei) (Government of 
Fiji 2009). One of the consequences of this 
approach was the general weakening of the 
established indigenous middle class through 
forced removal of prominent individuals 
from key public service, board and state 
corporation positions and the centralisation 
of power in the hands of the military.
After Fiji’s independence from Britain 
in 1970, pro-indigenous Fijian policies, bor-
rowed from Malaysia, were encapsulated 
in Development Plan 5 (Government of Fiji 
1970). Malaysia had special provision for 
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indigenous Malays in its 1954 Constitution 
and, in 1970, a major economic transforma-
tion under the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
was initiated to address the issue of ethnic 
economic imbalance and poverty reduction. 
Like Malaysia’s, Fiji’s affirmative action 
policy was driven by the desire for equal 
ethnic participation in the economy as part 
of the national unification strategy under 
the Alliance Party’s multiracial experiment 
aimed at more ethnic and regional equitable 
development. Affirmative action after the 
1987 and 2000 coups was, however, seen 
as a major social engineering project by 
indigenous Fijian élites to restructure the 
economy in favour of indigenous Fijians, 
very much along the lines of the economic 
restructure under Malaysia’s NEP.
Following the counter-ethno-nationalist 
coup in 2006, the term ‘affirmative action’ 
was removed and preferential policy was 
reconceptualised fundamentally along the 
pre 1987 policies of rural development to 
address indigenous socioeconomic interests. 
The dramatic shift in emphasis was driven 
by political circumstances. The post 1987 
and post 2000 affirmative action projects 
were driven by ethno-nationalism and were 
geared towards creating an indigenous 
middle class, while the post 2006 affirmative 
action was targeted at rural villages and was 
also meant to neutralise the form of ethno-
nationalism that fomented the 1987 and 2000 
coups. The military regime hoped that by 
satisfying the basic socioeconomic needs of 
rural indigenous Fijians, it would be able to 
neutralise the nursery for ethno-nationalism 
at the grassroots level and in the process 
shift away from past tendencies in which 
socioeconomic grievances were readily 
translated into nationalistic mobilisation.
This article is not a comparative study 
with Malaysia, but given the salience of 
Malaysia’s influence, the article will make 
comparative references to Malaysia’s affirm-
ative action program where appropriate.
The evolution of preferential 
programs
After Fiji became a British colony in 1874, 
the colonial state initiated a number of fun-
damental changes to the Fijian community, 
amongst which were the reconfiguration of 
the governance and chiefly structures, codi-
fication and universalisation of a common 
landowning system, and consolidation of a 
communal system around a village subsist-
ence economy (France 1969). This system 
kept indigenous Fijians outside the main-
stream commercial arena and proved to be a 
major factor in the retardation of indigenous 
Fijian development and the spawning of 
ethno-nationalist resentment (Lawson 1991). 
The resulting wave of ethno-nationalism in 
later years—fuelled by actual and perceived 
ethnic inequality in the labour market, 
ethnic competition over political power, 
and deployment of ethnicity for political 
mobilisation—provided the backdrop to 
the clamour for preferential policies for 
indigenous Fijians in later years.
Prototype affirmative action policies 
aimed at improving the socioeconomic 
situation of indigenous Fijians can be traced 
back to the first decade of the twentieth 
century when Governor Im Thurn was 
concerned that the rigid communal system 
instituted in 1876 by Sir Arthur Gordon, the 
first British governor, locked indigenous 
Fijians into an unproductive subsistence 
mode, and kept them outside the ambit of 
the mainstream commercial sector (Spate 
1959). Attempts to liberalise indigenous 
Fijian landownership and social structure 
met fierce resistance and had to be thwarted. 
There were, however, attempts to slowly 
socially engineer indigenous Fijians into 
mainstream commerce in the 1940s, 1950s 
and 1960s through banana and copra 
production as well as cooperatives. This 
action did not work very well because it 
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was carried out within the ambit of com-
munal hegemony, which restricts individual 
enterprise and, besides, these industries 
were monopolised by European merchants, 
who did not allow for competition from 
indigenous producers. The socioeconomic 
situation of indigenous Fijians became a 
serious concern of the colonial state, which 
consequently commissioned two reports—
the Spate Report (1959) and the Burn Report 
(1963)—both of which recommended con-
certed attempts to accommodate indigenous 
Fijians in the mainstream economy.
It was not until independence from 
Britain in 1970 that coherent development 
plans with preferential policies for indig-
enous advancement were designed. The first 
of these was Development Plan 5, which 
focused on ‘Fijian development’. The plan 
consisted of several large-scale agricultural 
development projects in the areas of sug-
arcane, banana and cattle farming, as well 
as educational and entrepreneurial experi-
ments that were meant to equip indigenous 
Fijians for the challenges of the fast-changing 
market economy (Government of Fiji 1970, 
1975, 1980). The banana and cattle farming 
projects were not commercially successful; 
however, a very small number of indigenous 
Fijian farmers made successful inroads into 
the Indo-Fijian-dominated sugar industry 
(Ratuva 1999). Simultaneously, there was a 
push for indigenous education to make up 
for the low number of indigenous Fijians 
in higher education and the professions, 
where 10 years before independence they 
were outnumbered by a factor of one to 36 
by other ethnic groups.
The first comprehensive educational 
affirmative action policy was in 1977, when 
the Alliance government, under Ratu 
Sir Kamisese Mara, an Oxford-educated 
high chief, legislated that 50 per cent of 
scholarships to the University of the South 
Pacific were to be reserved for indigenous 
Fijians (who at that time made up less 
than 50 per cent of the population). This 
issue is discussed in more detail later, but 
it is important to note at this stage that 
opposition to this policy came from the 
Indo-Fijian community, which saw it as 
a form of discrimination and an attempt 
to deprive deserving Indo-Fijian students 
(Ali 1982). As part of the aggressive push 
for indigenous education, the Fijian Affairs 
Board later provided special scholarships. 
Over the years these proved to be quite 
successful in terms of producing a large 
pool of graduates and consolidating a large 
indigenous middle class.
The emerging indigenous middle class 
by and large had a strong ethno-nationalist 
orientation, which resulted from their com-
petition with Indo-Fijians for civil service 
and private sector employment, which they 
perceived to be dominated by Indo-Fijian 
cliques. This antagonism was manifested in 
indigenous Fijian middle-class support for 
the 1987 coup, since it was hoped that the 
coup would weaken Indo-Fijian dominance 
in the political, civil service and professional 
realms. Since it was difficult to compete 
with Indo-Fijians at their own game, many 
indigenous Fijians thought it was more 
convenient to use political means to achieve 
their goals. 
The 1987 coups and coerced 
affirmative action
Although various forms of affirmative action 
have been adopted in Fiji since independ-
ence, the term ‘affirmative action’ was not 
used officially until after the first coup in 
May 1987, which saw the overthrow of 
an elected Indo-Fijian-dominated Labour 
Party–National Federation Party coalition 
government (Lal 1992). A second coup was 
carried out on 25 September 1987 to consoli-
date the first coup, after attempts to set up 
a government of national unity threatened 
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to undermine the intent of the first coup of 
indigenous political paramountcy. It became 
apparent to the pro-indigenous military 
leaders that there was a need to fast-track 
preferential policies outside the ambit of 
the usual development plan. The post 1987 
coup affirmative action plan had a number 
of strategic prongs. Amongst these were: 
control of state institutions by indigenous 
Fijians and use of the bureaucracy and 
political machinery to drive the affirmative 
action program; channelling state resources 
towards indigenous Fijians; increasing the 
number of indigenous Fijians in business; 
increasing the number of indigenous Fijians 
in the civil service; and creating and growing 
an indigenous Fijian middle class to balance 
the established Indo-Fijian middle class 
(Fijian Initiative Group 1992; Qarase 1995). 
Affirmative action became a political 
imperative under the direct supervision 
of the ethnocratic military state and was 
legitimised by the newly promulgated 
1990 ethno-nationalist Constitution, which 
prescribed indigenous Fijian political 
hegemony after the 1970 Constitution was 
abrogated (Ratuva 2000). A way of consoli-
dating hegemony was to ensure control of 
Parliament by increasing the number of 
indigenous Fijian seats by 15 compared with 
an increase of only five for Indo-Fijians. 
Furthermore, the 1990 Constitution tried 
to define the indigenous ‘Fijian’ affirmative 
action-designated category using two vari-
ables: a direct grand-patrilineal blood link 
and acceptance by one’s mataqali (traditional 
socio-cultural group) for registration in the 
Vola ni Kawabula—the indigenous Fijian 
genealogical registry (Government of 
Fiji 1990:120). This provision was heavily 
criticised for being too sexist, racist and 
exclusive because it discriminated against 
those with indigenous Fijian mothers 
but with non-indigenous Fijian fathers. 
The legal construction of the designated 
category was directly linked to the broader 
constitutional affirmative action framework 
that provided that 
Parliament shall, with the object of 
promoting and safeguarding the 
economic, social, educational, cultural, 
traditional and other interests of the 
Fijian and Rotuman people, enact laws 
for those objects and shall direct the 
Government to adopt any programme 
or activity for the attainment of the 
said objects and the government shall 
duly comply with such directions. 
(Government of Fiji 1990:s. 21) 
This paved the way for the enactment 
of affirmative action legislation in the 1980s 
and 1990s, including the controversial 
Public Service Commission Regulation, 
which reserved 50 per cent of civil service 
positions for indigenous Fijians (Fiji Republic 
Gazette, 4[83][1990]:910).
Civil service
The impact of the indigenisation of the civil 
service was almost immediate. In 1986, just 
prior to the coup, of the total number of civil 
service staff, 52 per cent were Indo-Fijians, 43 
per cent were indigenous Fijians and 5 per 
cent belonged to other minority groups. The 
high turnover of Indo-Fijian staff after the 
coup dramatically altered the ethnic profile. 
In 1987, of the total turnover, 80 per cent were 
Indo-Fijians and other minorities compared 
with about 20 per cent for indigenous Fijians 
(Table 1); and in 1988, the shares were 68 per 
cent and 32 per cent, respectively (Fiji Public 
Service Commission 1995).
By 1992, the turnover rate seemed to 
have stabilised, with the figures for the 
two major ethnic categories almost on par. 
The departures from the civil service were 
replaced with new appointments, which 
favoured indigenous Fijians. From 1991 to 
1994, indigenous Fijians constituted about 
60 per cent of the annual appointments 
(Table 2). Prior to the coup, in 1985, new 
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appointments to the civil service were 47 per 
cent for indigenous Fijians and 53 per cent 
for Indo-Fijians and other minorities (Fiji 
Public Service Commission 1986).
The changes in the ethnic shares of the 
civil service over the 10 years from 1985 
to 1995 were significant (Table 3). In 1985, 
the figures were indigenous Fijians 46.4 
per cent and Indo-Fijians 48 per cent. In 
1995, the share of indigenous Fijians had 
increased to 57.3 per cent, while the share 
of Indo-Fijians had declined to 38.6 per cent 
(Reeves, Vakatora and Lal 1996).
By 1997, only one of the 10 heads of gov-
ernment departments was an Indo-Fijian, 
compared with more or less equal numbers 
prior to the coup. About 80 per cent of the 
Indo-Fijians who left the civil service migrated. 
 In 1987, there was a net departure of 18,563, 
compared with 6,490 in 1986 and 6,193 in 
1985. Of these, 78.1 per cent were Indo-Fijians 
(compared with 41.2 per cent in 1980), 6 per 
Table 1 Civil service staff turnover, 1987–94
Year Fijian/Rotuman Percentage  
(of total)
Indian/others Percentage  
(of total)
Total
1987 258 20.5 1,003 79.5 1,261
1988 486 31.8 1,041 68.2 1,527
1989 676 40.0 959 60 1,635
1990 532 48.8 560 51.2 1,092
1991 393 40.9 567 59.1 960
1992 740 52.6 666 47.4 1,406
1993 697 54.9 573 45.1 1,270
1994 701 58.6 497 41.4 1,198
Source: Fiji Public Service Commission, 1995. Annual Report, Public Service Commission, Suva:16.
Table 2 Civil service appointments, 1991–94
Year Fijian/Rotuman Percentage Indian/others Percentage Total
1991 594 58.6 417 41.4 1,011
1992 1,182 58.0 857 42 2,039
1993 892 57.7 657 42.3 1,546
1994 631 57.2 472 42.8 1,103
Source: Fiji Public Service Commission, 1995. Annual Report, Public Service Commission, Suva:16.
Table 3 Total number of staff in the civil service by ethnicity
Year Fijian/Rotuman Percentage Indian/others Percentage Total
1991 9,296 55.8 7,360 44.2 16,656
1992 9,682 56.6 7,429 43.4 17,111
1993 9,631 56.8 7,317 43.2 16,948
1994 9,709 57.2 7,261 42.8 16,970
Source: Fiji Public Service Commission, 1995. Annual Report, Public Service Commission, Suva:15.
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cent indigenous Fijians, and 12.5 per cent 
other minorities. By 1989, however, two years 
after the coup, the total number of Indo-
Fijians migrating had declined to almost half 
of the 1987 figure (7,412), but their share still 
stood at 79 per cent. Altogether, an estimated 
50,104 Fijian citizens migrated in the period 
1987–91, compared with 26,529 between 1982 
and 1986. About 80 per cent of these were 
Indo-Fijians (Chetty and Prasad 1993). The 
pro-indigenous Fijian coup and subsequent 
reforms, including coerced affirmative 
action, forced Indo-Fijians out of Fiji in large 
numbers. 
Apart from the civil service, the two 
other important state apparatus whose 
control was deemed necessary for indig-
enous hegemony were the military and 
the police. The military had always been 
predominantly (more than 90 per cent) 
indigenous Fijian. In 1986, a year before 
the coup, the police force comprised 50 
per cent indigenous Fijians and 47 per cent 
Indo-Fijians; in 1995, the figures were 58 per 
cent indigenous Fijians and 40 per cent Indo-
Fijians (Fiji Police Force 1996). Immediately 
after the 1987 coup, the Indo-Fijian commis-
sioner of police was removed, together with 
other senior officers of ‘questionable loyalty’, 
and was replaced with an indigenous Fijian, 
who later retired to give way to a senior 
army officer, Colonel Isikia Savua. The 
police, like other areas of the civil service, 
became militarised as colonels took over 
senior positions, consolidating a military 
bloc within the civilian sphere. The triple 
processes of indigenisation, affirmative 
action and militarisation became part of a 
common political engineering process.
Business sector
As a means of addressing ethnic disparity in 
the business sector, a number of proposals 
were made in 1992 in a document called the 
Nine Points Plan. The plan was produced 
by the Fijian Initiative Group (FIG), which 
consisted of indigenous Fijian professionals, 
civil servants and entrepreneurs, and which 
first met in 1988 (under the chairmanship of 
former prime minister Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara) and became formalised in 1992. 
The major proposals were F$20 million 
equity was to be injected from the Fijian 
Affairs Board (FAB) to the Fijian Holdings 
Company (FHC), an indigenous trust com-
pany based on the Malaysian bumiputera 
trust company concept; a unit trust for 
indigenous Fijian financial investment was 
to be established; a compulsory savings 
scheme (CSS) for Fijians was to be set up; 
government concessions for indigenous 
Fijian businesses were to be enhanced; a 
Management Advisory Services Depart-
ment (MASD) was to be established in the 
FAB; and indigenous Fijians should have a 
50 per cent minimum ownership share of 
resource-based industries. Furthermore, 
certain sectors of the economy were to be 
reserved for indigenous Fijian investment; 
there should be ownership of a daily news-
paper by indigenous Fijians; and the FAB 
should be restructured and strengthened 
(Fijian Initiative Group 1992).
The main follow-up to the Nine Points 
Plan was the Ten Year Plan for Fijian Participa-
tion in Business, authored by Laisenia Qarase 
(1995), then managing director of the Fiji 
Development Bank (and a leading propo-
nent of ethnic Fijian affirmative action), 
and commissioned by the UN Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP). The report, which was 
more comprehensive than the Nine Points 
Plan, suggested that the objective of affirma-
tive action ‘should be the achievement of 
overall parity between Fijians and other 
communities in all spheres of activities 
within the shortest period of time possible’, 
and it should ‘ensure that indigenous Fijians 
achieve 50% ownership of the corporate 
sector and other business sectors by the year 
2005’ (Qarase 1995:4). The five strategies 
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suggested were enactment of appropriate 
legislation with the object of promoting 
and safeguarding the interest of indigenous 
Fijians; reorganisation and strengthening 
of the Fijian administration; accumulation 
of savings to provide investment capital; 
encouragement of indigenous Fijians in 
investment; and development of indigenous 
Fijian entrepreneurship, business educa-
tion and training. These strategies merely 
reinforced the basic tenets of the Nine 
Points Plan but the difference was its sense 
of urgency and the specific target of 50 per 
cent indigenous Fijian business ownership 
by 2005.
The Ten Year Plan, which later became 
the government ‘blueprint’ for indigenous 
Fijian business, identified a number of 
government-controlled industries for 
privatisation, with government shares to 
be transferred to Fijian Holdings and other 
indigenous Fijian corporations. These 
included big monopolies such as Fiji Post 
and Telecom, Fiji International Telecom-
munications Limited (FINTEL), Fiji Forest 
Industries Limited (FFI), Fiji Pine Limited 
(FPL), Tropic Woods Limited (TWL), the 
Pacific Fisheries Company (PAFCO) and the 
National Bank of Fiji (NBF).
A number of Ten Year Plan recom-
mendations were implemented. Some of 
these—similar to some of those imple-
mented in the Nine Points Plan—included 
the reorganisation of the Fijian administra-
tion, expansion of Fijian Holdings Limited, 
continuation of the Commercial Loans to 
Fijians Scheme (CLFS) by the Fiji Develop-
ment Bank (FDB), the setting up of the Unit 
Trust investment, establishment of a Small 
Equity Fund (SEF) within the Ministry of 
Fijian Affairs, and a management training 
scheme for indigenous Fijians in the private 
sector. By making the FAB separate from 
the Ministry of Fijian Affairs (one of the 
major reorganisations), it was hoped that 
interference by the central government in 
the communal affairs of the Fijian adminis-
tration would be minimised, thus providing 
the latter with the necessary autonomy to 
streamline its communal organisational role 
and maintain cohesion within the indig-
enous Fijian community, while at the same 
time creating a competitive indigenous 
Fijian bourgeoisie.
The lack of a sizeable indigenous Fijian 
entrepreneurial class was a major driving 
force in these economic reforms. There were 
differences in the ethnic distribution of 
economic activities, with indigenous Fijians 
concentrated more in primary agricultural 
activities and Indo-Fijians in the white-
collar professions. The conspicuously low 
representation of indigenous Fijians in the 
commercial sphere was evident in official 
company figures. For instance, between 
1986 and 1987, just before the coup, of the 
700 companies registered by the Office of 
the Registrar of Companies (1987:2), only 
15 per cent belonged to indigenous Fijians, 
compared with 50 per cent ownership by 
Indo-Fijians, 20 per cent by Europeans and 
Chinese, and 15 per cent joint ventures 
owned by other ethnic groups.
To the indigenous state élites, the 
panacea for inequality lay in catapulting 
indigenous Fijians into the business world 
with the help of state patronage. In 1992, 
the government allocated F$20 million as 
loans to FAB to buy ‘B’-class shares from 
Fijian Holdings Limited and to hold them 
in trust for indigenous Fijians to be sold to 
indigenous Fijian shareholders later.1 Since 
1987, the operations of Fijian Holdings have 
been aggressively extended to buying shares 
in many leading corporations in Fiji.
In 1989, the government provided two 
major concessions for the CLFS, which was 
set up in 1975 to assist indigenous Fijians 
in small to medium-sized businesses. The 
concessions were first, an increased subsidy 
of 5.5 per cent per annum on loans up to 
F$200,000, giving an effective interest rate 
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of 8 per cent; and second, a cash grant 
equivalent to 10 per cent of the fixed assets 
cost, with a maximum grant of F$20,000 
for each project (Fiji Development Bank 
1996). CLFS loans increased dramatically 
after the coup. For instance, in the 11 years 
between 1975 and 1988 there were 4,720 
loans totalling about F$25 million. But from 
1989 to 1994, there were 6,189 loans totalling 
F$99 million (Fiji Development Bank 1996). 
The upsurge in loan approvals from 1989 
‘reflects the impact of Government conces-
sions’ (Qarase 1995:29). Despite the initial 
optimism, CLFS loans had a high failure 
rate, with arrears averaging between 19 
and 23 per cent. Eventually, the scheme was 
forced to close. It was to be just one of the 
many failed affirmative action projects.
Perhaps an area where the quota system 
was most pronounced was in the taxi busi-
ness, which had always been dominated by 
Indo-Fijians. For instance, in 1988, 87 per 
cent of all taxi licences were in the hands 
of Indo-Fijians; only 11 per cent belonged 
to indigenous Fijians. On 22 October 1993, 
there was a ministerial directive that no 
more permits were to be issued to Indo-
Fijians to make sure that indigenous Fijians 
could bridge the gap. By 31 December 
1994, the Indo-Fijian share had fallen to 61 
per cent and the indigenous Fijian share 
had increased to 34 per cent (LTA 1995). 
Initially, upon being issued with licences, 
some indigenous Fijians either rented or 
sold them to Indo-Fijians; but over the years 
the number of indigenous Fijian-run taxis 
has increased sharply, with many forming 
successful taxi and mini-bus cooperatives.
One of the main indigenous Fijian 
commercial acquisitions was Fiji Television 
Limited (FTL). The government granted 
a 12-year exclusive television broadcast 
licence to FTL on the understanding that 
indigenous Fijian control of FTL would 
increase. In 1995, the main shareholders in 
FTL were the FDB (51 per cent), Television 
New Zealand (15 per cent), Fiji Post and 
Telecom (14 per cent), and the general public 
(20 per cent). The FDB’s shares were held 
in trust on behalf of indigenous Fijians, 
represented by the 14 provincial councils 
(Qarase 1995). The provincial councils 
owned Yasana Holdings Limited (YHL), 
a company established by the FAB to look 
after provincial investments. This was one 
of the many affirmative action projects 
based on communal ownership.
The Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) 
was also involved in a project called the Vil-
lage Housing Scheme (VHS), which was set 
up in 1987 to provide homes for rural villag-
ers. A total of 27,373 applications amounting 
to F$53.91 million were approved and paid 
out. This project, too, was later stopped 
because of its unsustainability (FNPF 2006). 
In addition, the FNPF set up the Small 
Business Equity Scheme (SBES) in 1990 
to provide finance for small businesses, 
especially those of indigenous Fijians. A 
total of 4,621 members have been assisted, 
representing F$17.22 million in payments. In 
1996, a total of 1,379 applications, amounting 
to F$3.5 million, were approved; of these, 
indigenous Fijians constituted about 90 per 
cent—1,200 applications—totalling F$2.76 
million in payments (FNPF 2006). 
As a way of mobilising resources and 
maintaining ethno-cultural solidarity, 
indigenous Fijians were encouraged to 
engage in communal investment through 
their extended kinship or administrative 
social groups such as tokatoka (group of 
nuclear families), mataqali (group of tokatoka), 
tikina (district), yasana (province), and other 
forms of collective groupings. These groups 
bought shares in Fijian Holdings, Unit Trust 
and other investment groups (Ratuva 2000). 
Even political parties and politicians formed 
investment groups on behalf of indigenous 
Fijian entrepreneurs. An example was the 
Gaunavou Investments Company Limited 
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(GICL) (Gaunavou literally translates as 
‘modern times’). The GICL, which was 
incorporated as a public company on 11 
November 1994, was set up by the Suva City 
Fijian Urban Constituency branch of the 
ruling Soqoqsoqo ni Vakvulewa ni Taukei 
(SVT) Party ‘with the positive intention to 
start and promote indigenous Fijian enter-
prise and business activities’ (Daily Post, 13 
March 1999:3). Amongst the shareholders 
were General Sitiveni Rabuka (the 1987 
coup leader and later prime minister) and a 
number of government cabinet ministers.
Education
Affirmative action in education was taken 
in response to serious concerns about the 
educational achievement of indigenous 
Fijians—even before independence in 1970. 
The Royal Commission on Education of 
1969 recommended ‘positive discrimination 
provisions’ for indigenous Fijians but it was 
not until 1977 that the government decided 
to implement the scholarship quota for entry 
into the University of the South Pacific.
Furthermore, a Fijian education unit 
was set up in the 1970s within the Ministry 
of Fijian Affairs to work collaboratively 
with the Ministry of Education to provide 
scholarships and resources for Fijian schools 
and also to monitor the progress and 
achievement of indigenous Fijian students. 
This effort was boosted by a F$3.5 million 
injection for Fijian education in 1984 to 
upgrade indigenous Fijian educational 
facilities and resources (including teachers) 
at the primary and secondary school levels, 
and to provide scholarships for indigenous 
Fijian students. It was felt that providing 
assistance at an early stage of educational 
development was crucial in building up 
a solid educational base for indigenous 
Fijians. A further F$2 million was used after 
the coup in 1987 to establish an Education 
Unit in the Ministry of Education and the 
setting up of educational media centres in 
rural areas for indigenous Fijian schools. The 
aim was for the ‘development of basic educa-
tion, particularly improvement of access to 
secondary education for rural students’ (Fiji 
Ministry of Education 1993:130). 
The proportion of government schol-
arships awarded by the Public Service 
Commission to indigenous Fijians for 
university education rose from 34 per cent in 
1970–74 to 44 per cent in 1980–84, and again, 
to 49 per cent in 1985–89, and to 52 per cent 
in 1990–92. This allocation was made despite 
the fact that indigenous Fijians constituted 
only about one-third of all students qualify-
ing to enter university. Moreover, following 
the 1987 coup, an average of 62 per cent of 
all in-service training scholarships was 
allocated to indigenous Fijians (Fiji Public 
Service Commission 1995). The FAB has also 
provided scholarships to indigenous Fijians; 
between 1984 and 1988, the FAB awarded 
1,181 local scholarships and 150 overseas 
scholarships. Over the period 1989–92, these 
numbers were increased to 1,719 and 108, 
respectively. In the 16 years up to 2001, the 
FAB provided up to 7,000 scholarships and 
about half of these graduated within the 
prescribed time (People’s Coalition Govern-
ment 2001). More than 90 per cent of these 
graduates entered the labour market and 
contributed to the expanding indigenous 
middle class.
The rise and demise of post 1987 
coup affirmative action
While some affirmative action programs 
such as education were successful, the rush 
to create an indigenous business class by 
trying to create an entrepreneurial culture 
within a short time had its tragic shortcom-
ings. In 1992, when Fijian Holdings became 
a limited liability company, a group of 
indigenous Fijian professionals and bureau-
crats who worked in state banks and senior 
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government positions was able to form 
companies using insider information to buy 
shares, even before the rest of the country 
knew what was happening (Korovulavula 
1993). This led to a huge scandal, which was 
covered widely in the local press and even 
debated in Parliament. The group had direct 
links to the military and state leadership and 
had significant influence on important state 
boards dealing with finance and investment. 
They had direct influence on state policies 
and the operation of state institutions and 
had a virtual monopoly of information 
and control of equity acquisitions in Fijian 
Holdings. Some of the illegal and unethical 
business practices were condoned because 
they were seen to be politically acceptable 
as part of the general purpose of speeding 
up indigenous Fijian entry into the business 
world. A number of these cases continue to 
be the subject of investigation by the Fiji 
Independent Commission Against Corrup-
tion (FICAC), set up by the Fijian military 
after the 2006 coup.
There was an even worse outcome 
when the state-owned National Bank of Fiji 
(NBF) collapsed as a result of liberal ‘loans’ 
to indigenous Fijians to fund their entre-
preneurial projects, middle-class lifestyles 
(housing, cars, credit cards, and so on), and 
other things. After the 1987 coup, the coup 
leader, Sitiveni Rabuka, personally went to 
the bank and told the Australian general 
manager that he was to be replaced with 
a local. To the military regime, the NBF 
held the key to financing affirmative action 
projects and had to be secured by all means. 
Millions of dollars were given out without 
security in a loan program that spanned 
the entire structure of the indigenous 
community—from the president (who was 
loaned more than FJ$5 million) and his 
family to unemployed youths. Gold credit 
cards, car loans, business loans, housing 
loans and even personal loans were given 
out liberally in the name of indigenous 
advancement. Within a few years, the 
bank became insolvent, debts were written 
off, and more than F$200 million was lost. 
A subsequent investigation unearthed a 
complex web of deals between politicians 
and businessmen involving money transfers 
and political patronage (Grynberg, Munro 
and White 2002).
One of the ironies was that although 
the NBF collapsed, the loans provided the 
means for a large number of indigenous 
Fijians to break into the middle class, at least 
in terms of lifestyle and self-perception, and 
expanded indigenous middle-class aspira-
tions in a significant way.
The ‘trickle-down’ strategy of the State 
was to encourage rural communities to 
invest in Fijian Holdings Limited (FHL) 
through communal investment. The initial 
funding was provided by the State through 
the FAB and was distributed to provinces, 
districts and villages. The problem was that 
the income generated from this investment 
scheme was minimal and had to be shared 
amongst the members of the respective 
communities. After one year of investment, 
the average return was about F$1 per person 
(Ratuva 2000). The communal investment 
program was more of a political strategy for 
indigenous mobilisation than one of indig-
enous economic advancement. Although the 
FHL concept was borrowed from Malaysia, 
in Malaysia, the investments in bumiputera 
trust institutions were individually based; 
in Fiji, they were communally based.
Except for FHL and education, almost 
all the post 1987 coup affirmative action 
policies failed, including FDB’s special 
housing and business loans for indigenous 
Fijians, and its Equity Investment Manage-
ment Company Limited (EIMCOL), the 
supermarket management trainee project, 
and the FNPF indigenous loans project. FHL 
now stands as the flagship of indigenous 
business and has become one of the major 
players in the Fijian corporate sector. By 
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Fiji to do business and even share their 
knowledge and experience with us 
both in the public and private sectors. 
We also want to give something in 
return, not merely take (Business 
Times, January 1994:10).
Part of the training program through a 
bilateral agreement with Malaysia was the 
sponsoring of the chief executive of FHL to 
study affirmative action in Malaysia—in 
particular, how the bumiputera trust agency, 
the NEC, worked and how it could be emu-
lated. The Malaysian ‘helping hand’ came 
to an abrupt end after the 1997 East Asian 
financial crisis, which crippled Malaysia’s 
economy and threw its own affirmative 
action program into uncertainty.
The failure of many post 1987 affirma-
tive action projects was due to a number 
of reasons. First, there was the mismatch 
between the political will and the entre-
preneurial conceptualisation. The political 
drive to implement the affirmative action 
policies was not guided by a systematic 
understanding of the socio-cultural context 
of the business environment. Second, the 
indigenous Fijian loan recipients were not 
provided with the right training in com-
mercial and investment techniques and 
had to rely solely on their own initiatives. 
Third, the Indo-Fijian business community 
strengthened its networks in order to keep 
indigenous business out, as they saw them 
as potential competitors, and kept tight 
control over markets through pricing. As 
a result, some of the indigenous initiatives, 
such as the supermarket experiment, failed 
(Ratuva 1999).
The failure of these projects was a big 
blow to the ambition and self-esteem of the 
indigenous élites behind the affirmative 
action programs. They had high expecta-
tions, driven by state rhetoric, that the 
economic renaissance of indigenous Fijians 
was at hand. The failure of many affirmative 
2008, the company had nine subsidiaries: 
Basic Industries Limited, Fiji Industries 
Limited, Blue Lagoon Cruises Limited, 
Clariti (South Pacific) Limited, FHL Securi-
ties Limited, Fijian Property Trust Company 
Limited, Fijian Holdings Trust Management 
Limited, Merchant Finance and Investment 
Company Limited and FHL Retailing Lim-
ited. It also had 12 associated companies and 
a total of 842 shareholders. FHL has a total 
investment portfolio of about F$142 million 
with annual group revenue of F$213 million 
and group net assets worth F$166.8 million 
(Fijian Holdings Limited 2008).
The very close ties between Fiji and 
Malaysia and Fiji’s attempts to emulate 
Malaysia’s affirmative action model and its 
political system led to an attempt to share 
Malaysia’s affirmative action benefits by 
encouraging successful Malaysian compa-
nies to invest in Fiji. This started off well in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Acquisitions included 
South Pacific Textile (Fiji) Limited, employ-
ing 250 people; the SIA Cash and Carry, a 
joint venture with local employees operat-
ing a retail outlet for imported garment and 
fashion accessories; the Malaysian Bank/
National Bank of Fiji partnership; and mas-
sive equity in Carpenters Corporation, one 
of the largest wholesale and retail outlets 
in Fiji. In tourism, the Malaysian Berjaya 
Corporation owned the Berjaya Inn in Suva; 
Sateras Resources Limited owned the Toka-
toka Resort near Nadi International Airport 
and the Suva Motor Inn in Suva; and the 
Malaysian Shangri-La owned the Mocambo 
Hotel and the Fijian Hotel, Fiji’s largest five-
star tourist resort (Ratuva 1999)
In encouraging Malaysian investors in 
Fiji, Dr Ahmed Ali, Fiji’s High Commis-
sioner to Malaysia in the early 1990s, said 
businessmen in both Malaysia and 
Fiji can tap the huge opportunities 
available in each other’s countries…
We want to welcome Malaysians to 
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(post 1987 coup) national census figures. 
There was an identifiable increase in the 
number of indigenous Fijians in the mana-
gerial category—from 487 in 1986 to 1,292 in 
1996; however, the real significance of this 
increase was much less than it appeared 
(Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1986, 1996). The 
threefold increase was due to two main 
reasons: first, the 1996 Census definition 
of the managerial category incorporated 
various other subcategories that were not 
included in the 1986 Census; second, from 
1992 to 1996, there was an increase in the 
number of loans to indigenous Fijians by the 
CLFS and thus there was a proliferation of 
‘companies’ to formalise business ventures, 
although many of these failed.
Nevertheless, the pattern of ethnic dispar-
ity in 1996 was almost the same as that in 1986. 
Indo-Fijians still dominated the managerial 
positions, with 76 per cent in 1986, increasing 
to 78 per cent in 1996 (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 
1989, 1998). Despite the economic affirmative 
action measures, the gap in the managerial 
category actually increased.
The 1996 Census report further disag-
gregated the managerial category into four 
subcategories: director/chief executive, 
small business manager, specialist manag-
ers, and other department managers. In all 
subcategories, Indo-Fijians and other ethnic 
groups dominated with between 60 and 82 
per cent of the total. The largest difference 
was in chief executive positions, of which 
there were 82 per cent Indo-Fijians and 
other ethnic groups and only 18 per cent 
indigenous Fijians. 
The only category in which there was a 
marked increase of indigenous Fijians was 
in professional and technical positions—an 
increase from 45 per cent in 1986 to 53 per 
cent in 1996 (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1998). 
This increase was mainly for two reasons: 
first, the large-scale emigration of Indo-
Fijian professionals after the 1987 coup; and 
second, the post coup affirmative action in 
action policies contributed to the demise of 
the support for Rabuka’s SVT Party and the 
fragmentation of the political allegiance of 
indigenous Fijians. The dramatic political 
changes and perceptions also led to the 
review of the 1990 Constitution, and eventu-
ally a new and more inclusive constitution 
came into being in 1997.
The new Constitution redefined the 
affirmative framework under the rubric 
of ‘social justice’ and extended the des-
ignated category to include not only 
indigenous Fijians and Rotumans but also 
other ‘disadvantaged’ groups. The social 
justice provisions of the 1997 Constitution 
attempted to incorporate trans-ethnic and 
class factors into the affirmative action pro-
gram. Affirmative action was conceived as 
a mechanism for ethnic and socioeconomic 
equity and national unity. As a result, a new 
Ministry of Multi-Ethnic Affairs was set up, 
which provided scholarships for Indo-Fijian 
and other minorities, based on their socio-
economic situation.
The 1999 election was carried out using 
the new alternative-voting system under 
the rubric of the 1997 Constitution. The 
new government, under the leadership of 
Mahendra Chaudhry, the first Indo-Fijian 
prime minister, did not consider affirmative 
action favourably in its ethnic form and 
began to institute policies that addressed 
the marginalised situation of minority and 
other disadvantaged groups. These policies 
were prematurely terminated after the 
overthrow of the government in the 2000 
coup. 
Did embourgeoisement work?
The question of whether affirmative action 
has worked is not easy to answer, given 
the complexity of the situation. But some 
comparative assessment can be made in 
terms of the 1986 (pre 1987 coup) and 1996 
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during the 1990–2003 period (Table 4). 
Therefore, it seems that affirmative action 
handouts hardly trickled down in terms of 
benefits to the lower-income groups. In the 
various affirmative action strategies such as 
the Nine Points Plan and 20 Year Plan, poverty 
alleviation did not feature at all. The focus 
was more on corporate participation and 
enhancing middle-class wealth.
The 2000 coup and affirmative 
action 
The ethno-nationalist coup in 2000 was 
seen as evidence by some indigenous élites 
that a much more concerted effort to speed 
up indigenous Fijian development was 
needed, and thus one of the urgent tasks 
of the interim government, led by Laisenia 
Qarase, an avowed ethno-nationalist, was 
to put together a comprehensive affirmative 
action framework to respond to the broad 
ethno-nationalist sentiments. The outcome 
was the Blueprint and Government Policy for 
employment and education, which led to 
the marginalisation of Indo-Fijians in the 
public service, as discussed earlier. Most of 
the indigenous professionals and technical 
experts were in the public sector.
The post coup economy, however, 
especially after 1990, went through a period 
of contraction, and was not favourable to 
investment. From 1991 to 1995, real per 
capita output growth averaged only 1 per 
cent per annum. This unfavourable invest-
ment climate affected everyone; thus, it 
cannot be seen as the explanation for the 
continuing ethnic disparity in socioeco-
nomic performance.
Clearly, while there has been an expan-
sion of the indigenous Fijian middle class 
in the area of the public service and the 
professions, this was not the case in the 
corporate sector. Furthermore, poverty 
was hardly addressed. Poverty amongst 
indigenous Fijians continued to grow over 
the years (Table 4).
The national, urban and rural rates of 
poverty among indigenous Fijians grew 





























* Percentage of population having an adult equivalent per capita income less than the Basic Needs Poverty Line. 
.. not available 
Source: Abbott, D., 2007. Fiji analysis of the 2002/03 household income and expenditure surveys: estimation of 
basic needs poverty lines and incidence of poverty in Fiji, Unpublished draft final report prepared for United 
Nations Development Programme, Suva:23.
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the Enhancement of Indigenous Fijians’ and 
Rotumans’ Participation in Commerce and 
Business (Government of Fiji 2000), popularly 
referred to as the ‘blueprint’, which outlined 
the strategic thrust for affirmative action. The 
blueprint called for the mobilisation of state 
political and administrative mechanisms 
and resources and integration into the 
macroeconomic framework of government 
(Government of Fiji 2000). The blueprint 
encapsulated the desires, frustrations and 
optimism of the post independence indig-
enous middle class. The material state of 
the Indo-Fijian middle class was seen as the 
yardstick for success and the solution was 
seen as establishing the conditions for emu-
lating the economic and business acumen of 
Indo-Fijians. The focus was not so much on 
equity creation within the indigenous Fijian 
community as on consolidating an indig-
enous middle class—a different approach to 
the pro-rural development approach of the 
early independence years.
The operational details were outlined 
in an even more comprehensive document, 
‘50/50 by year 2020’ (20 Year Plan for Fijian 
Participation in Business), aimed at the 
‘enhancement of participation of indigenous 
Fijians and Rotumans in the socio-economic 
development of Fiji’ (Government of Fiji 
2001). As part of the program, the entire 
civil service machinery was mobilised 
to identify and operationalise aspects of 
indigenous Fijian advancement in the areas 
of education, human resource development, 
commerce and finance, public enterprise 
reform, health, resource-based industries, 
tourism, culture and heritage, and rural 
development. The plan identified two major 
issues confronting Fiji: ‘narrowing the 
socio-economic disparities between ethnic 
groups through more equitable sharing of 
resources and socio-economic restructuring; 
and maximizing indigenous Fijian economic 
productivity in relation to resources such as 
land’ (Government of Fiji 2001:1).
Learning from previous affirmative 
action attempts, this document, using an 
equity index (EI) formula, attempted to 
analyse the state of inequity using official 
national census data and calculating how 
much the indigenous Fijian level of achieve-
ment would have to be accelerated to reach 
the desired 1:1 (50–50) target equity ratio 
(TER). The equity index was an attempt to 
quantify the levels of achievement of the 
various ethnic groups, expressed as a ratio 
between the existing level of equity (current 
distribution ratio, CDR) between indigenous 
Fijians and other ethnic groups, relative 
to the national population distribution, 
expressed as the target equity ratio (TER). 
The EIs for the different occupational cat-
egories were thus different (Table 1). Hence, 
different countries will have a different TER, 
depending on the population distribution. 
Because the Fijian population in 2001 was 
52 per cent indigenous Fijians and 48 per 
cent other ethnic groups, the demographic 
balance would be about 50–50—thus, the 
TER would be 1:1. To achieve equity, the 1:1 
TER must be reached.
The EI is therefore the number of times 
the output of a particular sector must be 
increased to achieve the 1:1 TER. Differ-
ent sectors have different CDRs and thus 
different EIs. For instance, in the corporate 
manager category, the CDR is 1:6; in other 
words, for every indigenous Fijian corporate 
manager, there are six from other ethnic 
groups. So to achieve the 1:1 TER, Fijian 
participation in this category should be 
increased six times; thus, the EI value is 6. 
Therefore, the target for the next 20 years 
was to increase the number of indigenous 
Fijians in the corporate manager category 
by a factor of six. The other five professional 
categories had a CDR of 1:3 and an EI of 
three (Table 4).
The 50–50 plan had a number of goals, 
including equality creation, national wealth 
redistribution, indigenous Fijian economic 
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advancement, and conflict resolution. But 
the political circumstances changed the 
situation dramatically. During the election 
in 2001, a new Fijian political party, the 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL), 
under Qarase’s leadership, used the 50–50 
plan as the major political campaign tool to 
mobilise indigenous Fijian votes through 
the unauthorised delivery to voters of 
goods ranging from lawnmowers to fishing 
boats worth more than $20 million. The 
politicisation of the plan drew widespread 
criticism, even amongst indigenous Fijians, 
especially after it was revealed that after it 
won the election, the SDL government had 
‘planted’ individuals within the system as 
‘distributors’ of affirmative action goods to 
favoured customers. A number of people, 
including the chief executive officer of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, were convicted 
and imprisoned in relation to what came to 
be known as the ‘agriculture scam’.
The continuing drive for the indigeni-
sation of the political process led the SDL 
government to push for two significant bills. 
The first was the Reconciliation, Tolerance 
and Unity Bill, which, amongst other provi-
sions, would see the release from prison of 
indigenous Fijian activists involved in the 
2000 coup; second was the Qoliqoli Bill, 
which attempted to transfer ownership of 
the coastal fishing grounds and seashore 
from the State to indigenous landowners. 
Both bills were very unpopular and cre-
ated tension within the country. The most 
significant reaction was from the military, 
which saw Qarase’s pro-indigenous policies 
as not only racist but also a security threat 
(Ratuva 2007). The tension between the SDL 
government and the military escalated, 
with the military telling the prime minister 
to rescind the racist policies and corrupt 
practices of his government. Qarase tried 
to remove the military commander, Com-
modore Frank Bainimarama, several times 
but to no avail, and the continuing tension 
culminated in Qarase’s displacement by the 
military on 5 December 2006. On 7 April 
2009, the military again took power after 
the Supreme Court decided the previous 
day that the 2006 coup was illegal.
Reinvention of affirmative action
The military regime undid what the Qarase 
government had put in place in a program 
they called a ‘clean-up campaign’. The 
political and institutional mechanisms for 
affirmative action and indigenisation were 
dismantled, including the removal of about 
200 indigenous Fijian CEOs and other senior 
officers in statal and para-statal institutions, 
some of whom had been beneficiaries of the 
Table 4 Equity index for selected professions
Occupational category Current distribution ratio (CDR) Equity index (EI)
Corporate manager 1:6 6
Physics, mathematics, engineering, science 1:3 3
Business and legal 1:3 3
Finance, sales, business 1:3 3
Extraction, building trade 1:3 3
Plant and machinery 1:3 3
Source: Calculated from Government of Fiji, 2001. 20 Year Plan for Fijian Participation in Business, Government of 
Fiji, Suva:40–5.
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affirmative action program in the public 
service since 1987. The military saw the 
pro-indigenous affirmative action program 
as racist, corruption riddled and against the 
noble values of multiculturalism.
The military established in place of 
the plan a National Council for Building 
a Better Fiji (NCBBF), whose task was to 
put together a ‘People’s Charter’—a docu-
ment that provided for integrated national 
socioeconomic development, security 
reform, governance reconfiguration, and 
socio-cultural cohesion. Instead of targeting 
only indigenous Fijians, the People’s Charter 
had its designated category broadened to 
include marginalised people from all ethnic 
groups.
The military also established FICAC as 
a state ‘clean-up’ institution and watchdog 
with powers to investigate those suspected 
of corruption under the FICAC Decree. The 
ambiguity of its role has made it a convenient 
agent for political witch-hunts of opponents 
of the regime and supporters of the previous 
government. A number of high-profile play-
ers, including the sacked CEO of FHL, former 
prime minister Qarase, and other proponents 
and beneficiaries of the affirmative action 
programs, have been hauled into court and 
tried for corruption. The legal processes 
continue. The military has used coercive 
tactics to institutionalise its economic and 
political reforms and remove opposition; and 
the anti-affirmative action has transformed 
the connotation of affirmative action from 
something positive to something socially 
regressive and morally evil.
The People’s Charter was more than 
just a blueprint for development. It was 
a framework for social engineering and 
socio-political reconfiguration as part of the 
revolutionary process of erasing the old order 
and creating a new one with new institutions 
and norms. Apart from the dismantling and 
reconfiguration of state structures, other 
powerful institutions such as the Great 
Council of Chiefs and the Methodist Church 
were paralysed and lost significant power 
and control over indigenous Fijians. This 
was a dual process of counter hegemony and 
re-hegemony, involving the neutralisation of 
the old hegemonic bloc and replacing it with 
a new one.
Part of the new hegemonic process was 
the rural development program. This was 
important for the military because at the time 
of the coup in 2006, indigenous Fijians saw 
the military as pro-Indian and anti-Fijian, 
especially after the weakening of indigenous 
Fijian institutions such as the Great Council 
of Chiefs. To appease indigenous Fijians, 
coup leader, Commodore Bainimarama, 
used a complex but clever tactical manoeuvre 
consisting of direct visits and service deliv-
ery in the form of roads, bridges and coconut 
bio-fuel plants. This policy has worked 
wonders, as chiefs and villagers presented 
their matanigasau (traditional apology) for 
opposing him earlier and promised to sup-
port him in his reforms.
During his visits to the villages, Baini-
marama emphasised that there would be no 
more Qarase-type ‘handouts’ in referring 
to affirmative action, and that the military 
government will not fund any more com-
munity halls and churches but will focus 
on economically productive projects, infra-
structure and education. Below is part of a 
typical speech, as presented to the people 
of Ovalau:
We urge members of the public to 
work hard. Stop relying on handouts. 
This Government will only see that 
our roads, water, education and other 
developments are done to move us 
forward…
Government will see that infrastructure 
is maintained to create business and [a] 
better economy for the people of Ovalau 
and for the future generations…
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We are committed towards change 
and the Charter outlines clearly these 
changes. We urge you to support these 
changes and maintain the support to 
whatever Government that will come 
into power after elections. (Press re-
lease, Fiji Ministry of Information, 16 
April 2010) 
In all the development projects, there 
was no mention of affirmative action or 
indigenous Fijians as target groups. The 
language of development was de-ethnicised 
as part of the social engineering process to 
make people think in ‘non-racial’ terms. 
Terms such as ‘rural and outer island dev- 
elopment’ were used instead of ‘rural indig-
enous Fijians’, although most of the rural 
development efforts were geared towards 
indigenous Fijians.
The only category that did not directly 
benefit rural indigenous Fijians was ‘multi-
ethnic affairs’.
To bolster indigenous Fijian develop-
ment, land reform is now being envisaged 
as a major socioeconomic fulcrum for 
development. 
Land reform in particular in relation to 
resource based sectors is paramount. 
Issues pertaining to the ailing sugar 
sector, the need to diversify into 
other crops and the imperative to 
have commercial farming can only 
be addressed in a meaningful way if 
more land is available for productive 
use on [a] long and secure tenure 
basis. (Press release, Fiji Ministry of 
Information, 16 April 2010)
Land reform was to be a mult i-
stakeholder approach involving farmers, 
landowners, government, the Native Land 
Trust Board (NTLB), funding agencies such 
as the Fiji Development Board, and the busi-
ness community. Land reform is to be part 
of a larger economic reform program (ERP) 
involving the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (ADB), which carried out a 
series of consultations with the military gov-
ernment on 10–24 November 2009. Amongst 
the recommendations of the team were the 
usual reforms in relation to the rules around 
land availability for productive use, reform 
of the civil service, public enterprises and 
statutory entities, and liberalisation of the 
economy. They also emphasised social 
protection measures targeted towards the 
poor, to reinforce current programs in the 
areas of the family assistance allowance 
scheme, poverty alleviation projects, care 
and protection allowances, capital grants 
to voluntary organisations, and a women’s 
plan of action.
Faced with economic contraction and 
diminished exports, the ambitions of the 
military regime for a vibrant economy can 
be sustained only through external interven-
tion. By embracing the IMF’s reform strategy, 
the military regime showed the level of 
desperation in the economy, which needs 
external financial injection to sustain itself. 
The consequences of IMF reform, especially 
if the negotiated $1 billion is provided, will 
lock Fiji deeper into long-term debt.
The reforms are part of the broader 
development framework encapsulated in the 
Ten Point Economic Plan (TPEP), which sets 
out specific targets to be achieved by 2020. 
These are 1) GDP to be increased twofold; 
2) elimination of the current account deficit; 
3) poverty to be reduced from current levels 
to less than 5 per cent of the population; 4) 
visitor arrivals to increase to six million; 5) 
the financial sector to be liberalised with a 
view to eliminating exchange controls; 6) 
communication services sector businesses 
to grow by 100 per cent; 7) self-sufficiency 
to be achieved in rice, meat and liquid 
milk production; 8) up to 90 per cent of all 
electricity generation to be converted from 
fossil fuels to renewable sources; 9) to 80 
per cent of all arable land to be brought into 
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productive use; and 10) the unemployment 
rate to reduce to less than 3 per cent (Press 
release, Ministry of Information, 16 April 
2010).
Ironically, the shift in the affirmative 
action paradigm is basically a resurrec-
tion of the development plans of the late 
1970s and 1980s, which clothed affirmative 
action in the language of rural develop-
ment. Unlike the post 1987 and post 2000 
affirmative action policies, after the 2006 
coup, the pro-indigenous policies were 
fundamentally integrated into the national 
development plan rather than being a sepa-
rate policy framework. The de-ethnicisation 
of the language did not mean that ethnic 
preferential intent had disappeared; it 
simply made it less conspicuous. One of the 
distinguishable features between the past 
affirmative action policies and the current 
one is the class dimension. Whereas the 
previous ones were targeted at consolidat-
ing the indigenous Fijian middle class, the 
post 2006 coup strategy was first to weaken 
the indigenous middle class created after 
the earlier affirmative action policies and 
at the same time to target the rural poor as 
a designated group. The de-ethnicisation 
of affirmative action was an attempt to 
de-politicise it. But this did not happen, as 
it led to politicisation of affirmative action 
in a different context.
The weakening of the indigenous 
middle class effectively undermines the 
powerbase of former prime minister Qarase 
and indigenous Fijian ethno-nationalism. 
After 1987, affirmative action policies had 
created a class of wealthy and powerful 
indigenous Fijians who fed on state patron-
age and resources. The military regime has 
tried to curtail the power of the middle 
class and shift the focus of infrastructure 
development to rural villages. This tactic 
has weakened and isolated those members 
of the middle class suspected of being 
opposed to the regime while simultane-
ously strengthening the power of those loyal 
to the regime. At the same time, it consoli-
dated the political support of village-level 
indigenous Fijians. Isolating and weakening 
the vocal indigenous middle class, paralys-
ing the Methodist Church, neutralising 
the Great Council of Chiefs, and winning 
the hearts of the indigenous Fijian villag-
ers were means of controlling the power 
of ethno-nationalism at the national and 
grassroots levels and harnessing it to the 
military’s tactical advantage. Contrary to 
his own well-known anti-ethno-nationalist 
sentiments, Bainimarama has reinvented a 
new form of ethno-nationalism amongst 
indigenous Fijians as a means of justifying 
the 2006 coup and sustaining his reform 
agenda.
Conclusion
The social engineering intent of Fiji’s 
affirmative action—largely imported from 
Malaysia—did not work as well as expected. 
Both countries were ethnically pluralistic 
with a demographically and politically 
dominant indigenous population, which 
was also the designated category for 
affirmative action. Malaysia’s NEP was 
seen by Fiji as the ethno-economic model 
of affirmative action to emulate to address 
issues of equity and potential conflict.
Amongst the affirmative action pro-
grams in Fiji derived from the Malaysian 
model were the setting up of an indigenous 
trust corporation, provision for special busi-
ness licences, preferential loans, preferential 
public service appointments, preferential 
scholarships, and the use of state patronage. 
The major differences, however, were that 
in Malaysia the equity shares in the trust 
companies were individually owned while 
in Fiji there was a tendency for communal 
ownership of equity. Another major differ-
ence was that before the 1997 East Asian 
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financial crisis, the dramatic economic 
growth in Malaysia was fuelled by a vibrant 
industrial and resource base, but this was 
not the case in Fiji, where the economy was 
weak and the resources for preferential 
disbursement were very limited.
The outcomes were more or less similar. 
The indigenous élites became the primary 
beneficiaries of affirmative action and, 
instead of addressing ethnic division, 
affirmative action widened ethnic differ-
ences. In the case of Fiji, ethno-nationalist 
passion, which was associated with affirma-
tive action, contributed further to political 
instability in 2000 when there was fear that 
an Indo-Fijian government would under-
mine indigenous Fijian privileges. In 2006, 
however, ethno-nationalist policies by the 
Qarase government angered the military 
and contributed to the military coup. On the 
other hand, affirmative action in Malaysia, 
under the authoritarian control of an indig-
enous state, maintained a relatively stable 
political system.
Affirmative action in Fiji has been 
a complex matter involving structural 
changes—more than simple policy pre-
scriptions. The response to the historical 
interface between ethnicity and class by 
the indigenous élites who controlled the 
state apparatus necessitated the need for 
affirmative action in the first place; but, 
over the years, there were significant shifts 
in the affirmative action policies as a result 
of regime changes. Since independence, 
affirmative action has been articulated 
as part of the national development plan; 
but this changed after the military coup 
in 1987 when affirmative action was seen 
as an urgent undertaking to transform the 
socio-political and socioeconomic landscape 
to facilitate indigenous Fijian advancement. 
The process intensified after the 2000 coup, 
as the need to address ethno-nationalist agi-
tation and instability became a paramount 
concern. Everything changed, however, 
after the 2006 coup when the military tore 
up the affirmative action programs on the 
grounds that they were linked to racism 
and corruption.
The most successful affirmative action 
program in Fiji was in education. The educa-
tion quota system expanded the ranks of 
Fijian graduates and, by the 1990s, a large 
indigenous Fijian professional middle 
class had been formed. At a time when the 
Indo-Fijian middle class was shrinking due 
to emigration, the indigenous middle class 
diversified, strengthened and helped sustain 
the labour market. It also acted as a trans-
formational and at the same time stabilising 
political force. Within the indigenous middle 
class, however, there were individuals and 
groups who materially and politically ben-
efited more than others because of their links 
with the state bureaucracy and indigenous 
political élites in a client–patronage network. 
Some of them were given positions as part 
of the political payoff for loyalty. For some, 
articulating the ethno-nationalist slogan and 
pro-indigenous policies was a ticket to higher 
and more secure positions within the state 
hierarchy. There were also liberal indigenous 
Fijians who opposed the affirmative action 
policies on the grounds that they reinforced 
the stereotypes of indigenous Fijians as lazy 
and incapable, and undermined motivation 
and self-enhancing initiative.
There were success stories of indigenous 
Fijians in commerce who were nurtured 
through the affirmative action process. 
There were, however, also failures. The post 
1987 coup affirmative action policies, while 
benefiting some individuals and groups, 
were at the mercy of indigenous Fijian élites 
who made use of the state patronage system, 
close links to banks and status in the com-
munity to siphon off benefits for themselves. 
While the military has been investigating 
some of these under its ‘clean-boy’ image, 
it too has been rocked by scandals. In fact, 
some of the senior officers in the military, 
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including cabinet members of the military 
government, were directly involved in the 
affirmative action scandals of the 1990s.
The focus of the post 1987 affirmative 
action on embourgeoisement meant that 
poverty and social marginalisation were 
ignored. The State’s solution was to have 
indigenous Fijians take part in communal 
and kinship investment schemes, which 
yielded very little by way of family income. 
The affirmative action benefits did not 
really trickle down to the grassroots. While 
the designated category was indigenous 
Fijians generally, the actual beneficiaries 
were those in the urban indigenous middle 
class. Contrary to the original intentions, 
affirmative action merely widened the 
ethnic rift between the indigenous and 
other ethnic groups, as well as exacerbating 
class differences within the indigenous 
community itself.
There were high hopes that the post 
2000 affirmative action policies would 
rectify the situation, but instead, due to lack 
of systematic monitoring, weak manage-
ment of the affirmative action governance 
process and direct political manipulation, 
there were high-profile scandals that 
undermined the integrity and reputation of 
affirmative action as a reliable redistribution 
program.
Paradoxically, while the current military 
regime’s anti-affirmative action policy 
seems to be at odds with the ethno-
nationalist desire for affirmative action, 
their ultimate aims seem mutual. They both 
want political stability and the elimination 
of the differences created by the interplay 
between ethnicity and class. While one tried 
to do it through ethnicity-based affirmative 
action, the other has tried to de-ethnicise the 
process using coercion.
Note
1 This loan was later converted to a grant by 
the Qarase government; but in September 
2010, the Bainimarama military regime 
converted it back into a loan to be repaid to 
the government.
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